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a systems theoretical approach
Abstract
Purpose – The paper seeks to explain the de-risking phenomenon through Luhmann’s risk/danger model and 
demonstrate that de-risking should be facilitated and encouraged. 
Design/methodology/approach - The paper applies Luhmann’s system theory and more specifically his 
risk/danger model in order to describe the de-risking phenomenon and identify recommendations to address its 
consequences.
Findings – The paper finds that re-defining risk and the AML’s community’s understanding of it can support 
key stakeholders’ understanding of ML risk and the way to better address consequences of AML decisions. 
Practical implications – The paper has implications for the banking and regulatory community in relation to 
the interpretation of de-risking. As systems aim to minimize their exposure to risk, they should not be prevented 
from de-risking.  
Originality/Value - This paper aims to move away from a narrative description of AML phenomena and 
presents a theoretical foundation for the analysis of ML risk. The current response to de-risking which 
demonises it and aims to prevent it is deconstructed through this theoretical lens. 
Keywords - money laundering, Niklas Luhmann, systems theory, decision, risk, danger
Paper type – Conceptual paper 

































































The domain of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) has seen a number of key transitions in relation 
t  how the risks associated with Money Laundering (ML) have been handled. In the rules-
based approach, ML-risk was managed through fixed sets of constructed indicators (Ross and 
Hannan, 2007). In the transition to the risk-based approach (RBA) (FATF, 2007), a more 
malleable and flexible path was sought, with risk sensitivity and a cluster of additional risk-
related concepts being introduced to allow institutions to express their personalised and 
customised risks. These have allowed risk prioritisations and customisations for financial 
institutions and other Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs). 
However, this malleability has also led to the emergence of ambiguity, with de-risking as the 
pinnacle of such perceived unintended consequences. Since then, de-risking in AML has been 
vilified and seen as a misunderstanding of the RBA, the refusal to apply it and, increasingly, 
the realization that the RBA may essentially imply a de-risking approach. Admittedly, some 
well-founded objections to de-risking included the possible push of laundered funds into 
alternative underground remittance systems and less-monitored routes (Ramachandran, Colin 
and Juden, 2018). But overall, is this attitude towards de-risking an accurate reflection of the 
complexities of risk? With the entanglement of the risk-based approach and de-risking, the 
concept of risk has come to occupy a central stage in our field. But how well do we understand 
risk to begin with? How can we explore AML risk and its broader fabric of interferences? 
This paper aims to deconstruct the nature of risk within the domain of AML and explore how 
different stakeholders observe and manage ML risk, thereby impacting the risk management 
initiatives of each other. A greater insight into the nature of AML risk will give us the tools to 
a) understand the key drivers of de-risking, b) enhance risk management approaches to handle 
de-risking, and c) consider the systemic character of risk in the domain of ML prevention 
efforts. It is in this context that this paper seeks to dissolve one of the most recent contemporary 
myths in the domain of AML: the myth that de-risking can be, and more importantly, should 
be prevented. Following the review of related work in the next section, the paper takes a 
systems theoretical treatment of risk that is based on the work of sociologist and systems 
theorist, Niklas Luhmann. Based on the insights drawn from applying Luhmann’s work into 
Barclays bank’s handling of High-Net-Worth Individuals and an illustrative case of its de-
risking of Money Services Business (MSB) Dahabshiil, the paper posits that de-risking should 
































































not be demonised and should be viewed instead as an essential element within the broader 
nexus of risk-based management and governance of ML risk.
RELATED WORK
Current literature on the domain of ML risk, de-risking and risk appetite, fails to develop 
theoretical foundations or frameworks through which AML risk can be reflected upon. Such 
frameworks should not only be integrative of the challenges faced by risk practitioners across 
various financial institutions but should also capture the perspectives of Financial Intelligence 
Units or regulatory bodies. Current scholarly or industry work relating to AML is either 
anecdotal or descriptive on risk, with key strands revolving around ML typologies (Menz, 
2019), regulation (Rose, 2019), or the wider financial and economic consequences of de-
risking (Ramachandran et al, 2018). Such work is useful in informing both practitioners and 
academics of latest risk-related developments and in reflecting on regulators’ and obliged 
entities’ initiatives as well as internal processes (Naheem, 2020). However, more theoretical 
work is required so that we can approach the foundational conditions upon which AML risk is 
expressed. Without challenging the foundations of risk in AML, it is difficult to maintain an 
informed debate around what the future of the RBA should be.
Although there has been an increase in the ML-risk related narratives observed over the past 
30 years (Hutter, 2005; Le Bouter, 2014; Wildavsky, 1979), with AML regulation following 
suit and becoming risk-based, ML risk and risk appetite has not been “conceptualised and 
analysed in much more concrete terms than in the past” (Ross and Hannan, 2007, p.113). 
Discussion in current academic and industry literature on the actual nature of ML risk is 
disappointingly sparse (Artingstall et al., 2016). Ultimately, ML risk and its key attributes need 
to be understood and the RBA simply does not provide the tools to achieve this. 
For instance, the published FATF guidance on the RBA (FATF, 2014) mentions risk appetite 
just twice and does not provide guidance as to how an institution could or should articulate it. 
Furthermore, the FATF statement concerning ML risk appetite is not specific: “supervisors 
have to take steps to check that their staff are equipped to assess whether a bank’s policies, 
procedures and controls are appropriate in view of the risks identified through the risk 
assessment, and its risk appetite” (FATF, 2014, p. 15). Similarly, financial institutions’ remarks 
regarding ML risk appetite are vague. Financial institutions’ “risk appetite statements often 
































































contain broad definitions of acceptable risk, such as minimal tolerance for residual Financial 
Crime risk” (Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 8). In addition, research on de-risking sponsored by the 
Financial Conduct Authority states: “we find that ML/TF risk appetite is difficult to articulate 
and measure, perhaps unsurprisingly. Banks are still developing this art and in particular find 
it difficult to ‘price’ (in broad terms) ML/TF risk” (Artingstall et al., 2016, p.23). 
In summary, there exists no explicit ML risk appetite documentation nor official 
communication between financial institutions and regulators as to their respective risk 
appetites. This must be differentiated sharply from the risk-based applications of typologies 
where the categories of ML/TF entity-based suspicion are expressed. For example, by relying 
on the RBA, a financial institution would recognise the categories of ML risk that it considers 
as high-risk (PEPs, Cash-Based Institutions, etc) but this articulation suffers from two 
contingencies: a) it results in the paradox of the risk-based approach as each category requires 
further differentiation (Demetis, 2009) wherein we can have a Politically Exposed Person 
(PEP) automatically classified as high risk as per FATF recommendations but subsequently 
assigned a high PEP risk or a low PEP risk, ultimately undermining the ‘umbrella’ 
classifications of the RBA to begin with, and b) it remains unlinked to the risk appetite of the 
institution. 
The phenomenon of de-risking is particularly illustrative of the way the RBA fails to 
accommodate institutions’ risk appetite as well as risk’s systemic nature. Although de-risking 
is the empirical manifestation of financial institutions’ appetite to risk, de-risking is currently 
narrowly defined as “the phenomenon of financial institutions terminating or restricting 
business relationships with clients or categories of clients to avoid, rather than manage, risk in 
line with the FATF’s risk‐based approach” (FATF, 2014, para. 1). It has had unfortunate 
repercussions such as, for example, “reducing the flow of remittance to developing countries” 
(Ramachandran, et al., 2018, p. 250) and making such flows less transparent by being pushed 
into Hawala networks which are not easily regulated. How did we come to this position? How 
did the application of the risk-based approach lead to de-risking?
Although there are a number of drivers of de-risking (declining client profitability, increased 
compliance costs, increased regulatory and reputational risks), one of de-risking’s key drivers 
is the application of the RBA itself. This can be traced back to the FATF and how it has 
encouraged institutions to develop risk assessment tools, identify high-risk clients and 
































































implement initiatives to mitigate high risks. Annex III of the fourth AML directive goes as far 
as to list correspondent banks and money transfer businesses as high-risk clients as if the 
category within which they belong, automatically makes them a high-risk entity. This paradox 
of the risk-based approach and the denial that - within each category - there is a myriad of other 
characteristics, attributes, proxies, that can reduce/increase the individual risk for each entity 
has only attenuated the problems. Behind the denial of this paradox lays the belief that risk is 
an objective construct which can be dissected, measured and deployed in AML. However, all 
the problems that institutions are experiencing when applying the RBA is proof, if needed, that 
risk is a subjective and an observer-relative construct. Consequently, categorisations like 
“money transfer businesses are high-risk clients” are both ontologically and epistemologically 
absurd. Alas, they are convenient for institutions that handle millions of transactions from such 
customers and they try to reduce their complexity en masse when needed. 
The ever-increasing focus on AML and CFT within a risk-based regulatory environment has 
essentially developed a culture that can only aspire to de-risking (Rose, 2019). And yet, the 
FATF and supervisory authorities assume that de-risking is risk avoidance instead of risk 
governance and management. They fail to see that the majority of financial institutions that 
terminate certain relationships aim to reduce the complexity they face after having assessed, 
through the RBA, that ML risk is a composite of many elements and parameters that are 
interdependent. On such occasions, de-risking is a decision made by a financial institution to 
communicate its new risk appetite and regulate its exposure to ML risks.
The concept that de-risking is a form of risk governance and management is re-inforced by the 
FCA report on de-risking (Artingstall et al., 2016). This report highlights that both FATF and 
FCA statements on “wholesale cutting loose of entire classes of customers” (FATF, 2015) and 
“banks dealing generically with whole categories of customers or potential customers” (FCA, 
2015) are frustrating to banks. “A bank’s decision on risk assessment may be the same whether 
it is undertaken on a case by case basis or wholesale basis, because the factors applied will not 
vary too much” (Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 19). “Risk assessments will score similar customers 
in similar ways. A set of similar customers will fall outside the FIs’ risk appetite and thus be 
exited” (Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 24). Regulators should be cognisant of this fact. Far from 
being a phenomenon that should be demonised and prevented at all costs, de-risking should be 
accepted and, as subsequently argued, facilitated and incentivised. Consequences associated 
with de-risking can be avoided by acknowledging the systemic nature of risk and implementing 
































































recommendations that aim to counter-balance the impact of de-risking initiatives. Under certain 
circumstances, consequences like having financial access difficulties, can be detrimental to 
other institutions or entities as documented in current literature (Buckley and Ooi, 2014; 
Oxfam, 2013; Ramachandran et al., 2018). This is further explored in the following section.
Another weakness of the RBA is how it fails to capture the differences in risks faced by 
financial institutions and regulators and the dynamic feedback loop between those risks, again 
highlighting the wider issue raised by Ross and Hannan (2007) and Demetis and Angell (2007) 
on the “complexity of representing risk” (p. 426). Certainly, both financial institutions and 
regulators are required to manage and minimise ML risks through the RBA. However, while 
financial institutions must focus on managing regulatory risk (defined as risk of changes to 
regulation or misalignment of regulatory interpretation), regulators face another kind of risk, 
namely the risk of losing their credibility. For instance, Black and Baldwin highlight the 
challenges faced by regulators when applying the RBA:
“Risk-based regulators have to address a number of issues including: the risks they will 
identify as requiring attention; the indicators and methods they will use to assess those 
risks; where they will prioritise their attention and where they will not. They will also 
have to decide how the implementation of the risk-based framework will be managed; 
how it will be justified and communicated both internally and externally; how they will 
respond to changes and, ultimately, what level of risk or failure they are prepared to 
accept” (2012, p. 2). 
Hence, should ML scandals arise, regulatory bodies need to be able to justify their previous 
and current decisions as well as actions in order to preserve their credibility. Press releases and 
reports issued by the Estonian and Danish regulators in the aftermath of the Danske Bank 
scandal, for example, certainly offer an excellent illustration of this point. 
The incongruence between how the RBA implementation is expressed and how the risk 
appetite of a financial institution could be articulated is further illustrated by the lack of 
methods to quantify ML risk. Efforts to perform these tend to go through the application of the 
Risk Based Approach which is, right now, the only widely available method to evaluate ML 
risk. The RBA methodology aims to split ML risk into a set of pre-identified risk categories 
such as “country or geographic risk, customer risk, and product/services risk and the 
application of these risk categories is intended to provide a strategy for managing the potential 
risks” (FATF, 2007, p. 22). However, we find that this reductionist approach, while useful in 
observing individual risk categories, fails to identify and account for the interconnectedness 
































































and the systemic character of risk (Ackerman, Eden, Williams and Howick, 2007). Unlike other 
phenomena, risk feeds off itself, generating further risk that ripples across institutions in a 
dynamic way.  For example, as of March 2021, the impact and consequences of the decisions 
made by Danske Bank Estonia to onboard high-risk non-resident customers in 2007 are still 
being felt, despite the fact that the non-resident portfolio was closed in 2015. In late January 
2020, the Danish Business Authority, Denmark’s business watchdog, announced that two Ernst 
and Young auditors were being brought before the Danish Disciplinary Board of Auditors for 
failing to meet auditing standards when providing services for Danske Bank in 2014. Similarly, 
a group of institutional investors are launching a EUR 358 million lawsuit against Thomas 
Borgen (ex-Danske CEO) for misleading investors (Monroe, 2020). In addition, the September 
2020 FinCEN files leak indicates that Danske Bank Lithuania may also have weaknesses in its 
AML controls as well as the fact that Danske Bank had links to drug trafficking gang ‘The 
Brothers’ circle’, money-launderer Altaf Khanani, and was involved in mirror trading (ICIJ, 
2020). Thus, six years on, the scandal continues to reverberate beyond what classical AML 
methods would have assessed and predicted since risk feeds off itself and cannot be ringfenced 
within one institution, nor jurisdiction, nor a specific point in time.
This complex set of risk related elements that propagate from one institution to another, point 
to feedback and systemic irritations that cannot be accounted for by the current AML 
framework; the current deconstruction of ML risk into sub-risks using the risk-based approach, 
ignores the systemic nature of ML risk (Demetis and Angell, 2007). In their attempts to 
deconstruct risk, some obliged entities have created additional prisms through which to observe 
ML risk—namely, regulatory risk, reputational risk, market risk, correspondent banking risk, 
risk of poorly integrated IT systems, failed internal AML procedures, staff complacency and 
internal collusion—which have been superimposed onto the traditional categories documented 
in the FATF’s risk-based approach guidance. This condition is telling of risk and underscores 
a deep epistemological delusion whereby the conversion of risk as a subjective, sociotechnical 
construct is attempted into a quantifiable reality that can be acted upon. German Sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann describes this process as ‘scientization’. “The process of ‘scientization’ 
reflects a method through which humans mistakenly identify social constructions as naturally 
occurring phenomena” (Russell and Brabow, 2011, p. 244). Attempts to understand risk solely 
through a predictable, automated methodology can actually be counterproductive. For 
example, if a low risk customer performs a transaction to a high risk jurisdiction, the 
































































scientization of risk scores confuses the process. The transaction may be high risk but the 
customer is not. In sum, in spite of its burdensome complexity, such a tool may flag cases too 
broadly to be useful. One instance where this can be observed is in the application of transaction 
monitoring software, where the scientisation of risk generates false positives (Demetis, 2019). 
This hinders AML efforts, creating further dangers that require internalisation. 
Attempts to capture ML risk through an ever-expanding list of risk categories, evolve when 
knowledge about new (sub)categories of ML-risks emerges through the latest ML scandal or 
accumulated via AML reporting routes (e.g. FATF typology reports). Such attempts indicate 
that ML risk has no boundaries, travels across a multitude of environments and systems and is 
thus observable to fraud risk specialists, operational risk practitioners, journalists, investors, 
shareholders, the media, laypeople, etc. Thus, ML risk evolves through the eyes of multiple 
observers and environments, creating further risk and enhancing ML risk’s interconnectedness. 
Given the systemic characteristics of risk and the gap in the industry’s current approach in 
dealing with ML, we adopt a systemic view of risk in the tradition of second order cybernetics 
(Von Foerster, 1981; Luhmann, 1993). By doing so, we attempt to approach the foundations 
of risk as a social construction and relate systemic risk to the challenges faced within the 
domain of AML. This theoretical approach can allow us to reflect on the structure of its 
propagation from one system to another and the wider consequences of risk. In order to provide 
a systemic framework within which to understand and analyse ML risk, a brief introduction to 
Luhmann’s Systems Theory is offered below with an emphasis on risk (Luhmann, 1993). The 
concepts described will be subsequently applied onto AML phenomena and we shall use an 
illustrative case from Barclays bank’s de-risking of Money Services Businesses (MSBs) in 
order to explain why de-risking should be accepted, facilitated and incentivised.
THEORETICAL APPROACH THROUGH LUHMANN’S RISK FRAMEWORK
Luhmann’s theoretical framework is based on a multiplicity of disciplines, including biology 
(Maturana and Varela, 1980), mathematics (Spencer-Brown, 1969), sociology, (Parsons, 1951) 
and cybernetics (Ashby, 1957; Bertalanffy, 1968; von Foerster, 1974, 1981). Indeed, 
“Luhmann sees the nucleus of cybernetic thought in the notion that a system whose operations 
are oriented on the fulfilment of certain purposes will orient its behaviour on a constant 
feedback from the environment and can therefore cope with a high, unknown level of 
































































complexity” (Paetau, 2013, p. 79). Financial institutions, insofar as they are dealing with a web 
of ML typologies, compliance-oriented challenges, and the unavoidable ambiguities of RBA’s 
interpretation, face similar levels of complexity, both within their own systems, and in their 
respective environments. As argued by Borsch (2011), it is precisely this multidisciplinary 
approach within systems theory that enables Luhmann to develop a grand theory successfully. 
As the field of AML itself draws from different disciplines in its attempts to tackle ML, a more 
general theoretical approach can allow us to identify the wider transitions that occur within our 
field. Luhmann’s insights on risk can thus be applied to the RBA. 
Following a long tradition of systems theorists, Luhmann observes the world as systems and 
environments. A system is distinct from its environment, and since the environment is not a 
system, it does not have the same capabilities as the system (Luhmann, 1995a). Furthermore, 
a system cannot exist without being separated from its environment. If the distinction between 
a system and its environment is not made, “if everything blends into everything else and no 
clear boundaries can be established, then no system exists” (Borsch, 2011, p. 21). Thus, for 
any given system, the system is “nothing but the difference to its environment” (Luhmann, 
2002, p. 66). 
For Luhmann, systems have their own functions and system formation is the key feature of 
modern society. As such, the system is Luhmann’s essential starting point and the starting point 
of any system’s theoretical analysis. However, the function of the system is, simply, that of 
differentiation (or distinction) between system and environment for the purpose of minimising 
the complexity of the environment. Indeed, “the social world comprises enormous complexity 
which social systems each, in their own way, reduce” (Borsch, 2011, p. 7). 
The following diagram conceptualises the system and its environment: 
             
Figure 1: System, Environment and Boundary
































































The difference between system and environment can only be delineated by the observing entity 
marking the boundaries between system and environment. 
Therefore, “the definition of a system, indeed any definition for that matter, is above all an act 
of choice and an observer-relative act. The observer is crucial in the construction of any 
system” (Demetis, 2010. p. 42). Depending on what the observer is focusing on (e.g. an AML 
transaction monitoring system, or the system of the Egmont group), a system can be anything 
ranging from a human organism, society, a financial institution, or a financial intelligence unit, 
among countless other entities. It can be anything the observer conceives of as a system. 
While the environment is more complex than the system because it has more options, variety, 
and degrees of freedom, the system compensates for its ‘inferiority’ by eliminating or 
introducing degrees of freed m. For instance, referring back to Figure 1, if the system is a 
financial institution and the ruling government (i.e. another system within the environment) 
were to announce further economic and financial sanctions against Russia, the system might 
decide to no longer bank with Russian nationals in order to avoid sanction breaches and 
regulatory fines. Now that system and environment have been introduced, risk according to 
Luhmann can be discussed. 
To Luhmann, risk is not ontologically real but instead, it is a social construction. As he 
mentions: 
“The already familiar discussions on risk calculations, risk perceptions, risk 
assessment and risk acceptance are now joined by the issue of selecting the risks to be 
selected or ignored. And once again, discipline specific research can reveal that this 
is not a matter of chance but that demonstrable social factors control the selection 
process” (Luhmann, 1993, p.4).
Luhmann’s work on risk operationalises a key distinction: that between risk and danger. The 
key difference between risk and danger is that of attribution: the difference is determined by 
the observer. In short, a decision maker will observe the consequence of his decision as a risk 
that he has decided to internalise while the non-decision maker (i.e. the affected party) will 
observe the consequence of someone’s decision as a danger emanating from its environment. 
Nevertheless, both the affected party and the decision maker observe the same phenomenon, 
albeit with an observer-relative sensitivity towards its interpretation in the duality between 
risk/danger. Thus, both risk and danger are manifestations of the same phenomenon observed 
by different observers. The fundamental point to consider, however, is that the distinction 
































































between risk and danger does not hinge on certainty or safety but on attribution: risk is 
attributed to the system’s decisions while danger is attributed to the environment. Risk is “the 
possibility of future damage, exceeding all reasonable costs, that is attributed to a decision” 
(Luhmann, 1990, p. 225) while “danger is a possible loss considered to have been caused 
externally” (Luhmann, 1993, p. 22). However, from the perspective of an individual who did 
not make the decision or accept the associated risks, the possibility of a loss is perceived as a 
danger that is caused by an external force. Thus, even though a decision may be made as part 
of a democratic process, the possibility of loss or damage is not voluntarily accepted by all 
potentially affected parties through the decision making process. As Luhmann discusses:
“Decisions are always the decisions of somebody, not the decisions of everybody. 
Therefore the real dangers in modern society are the decisions of others. Almost all 
other dangers, including natural disasters, can be avoided, for instance by moving out 
of a region threatened by storms or earthquakes and settling elsewhere. But the danger 
that results from the decisions of others cannot be avoided because others are 
everywhere” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 226).  
The 2008 financial crisis illustrates this point. Senior management and shareholders of the big 
financial institutions that were deemed “too big to fail” (Sorkin, 2009), perceived the 
possibility of a financial crisis as a risk while taxpayers perceived it, and ultimately experienced 
it, as a danger. However, the 2008 crisis also showed that decision-makers - such as Lehmann 
Brothers, Merrill Lynch or Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae - became affected parties too. The 
danger such financial institutions generated through their very own decision-making was so 
great, that their environment (i.e. governments and regulators) had to internalise it as risk.  This 
generated further danger to the initial decision makers who therefore became victims. 
Overall, on the basis of the few concepts described above (e.g. system/environment, 
risk/danger), we illustrate Luhmann’s risk model in figure 2. There are two separate systems 
(System A that makes the decision and System B that is the affected party or the victim) and 
describe the basic principles of the model right after with an example.
































































Figure 2: Luhmann’s Risk Model (based on Luhmann, 1993)
We take System A here to be a financial institution. Danger (e.g. a customer that may be 
actively looking to launder money or simply a high risk Politically Exposed Person (PEP) or a 
High Net Worth customer) originates from the environment and irritates system A. If the 
financial institution (i.e. System A) makes the decision to internalise the danger (e.g. accept a 
high-risk client which may expose the institution to ML risk and/or regulatory scrutiny) then 
System A will internalise danger into risk and reap any associated rewards (e.g. high 
commission rates on future transactions). Thus, once internalised, the danger becomes a risk 
for System A. 
However, decisions made by the financial institution to internalise dangers and convert them 
into risks will also produce second order dangers which are external to the financial institution 
(System A) and impact other systems such as System B. For instance, an institution’s decisions 
to consistently onboard high risk customers may expose the jurisdiction it is based in, the wider 
regulatory environment and the regulator to the danger of higher exposure to ML. In figure 2, 
System B is the regulator who faces the danger that results from System A’s decision. 
To a second order observer, the risk/danger distinction changes depending on who the first 
observer is (i.e. System A or B). Consequently, risk is also an observer-relative construct. In 
summary, decision makers generate risks and victims, who are not involved in the decision 
making process, face the associated dangers. 
































































To provide an empirical illustration of Figure 2, we refer to the 2015 Barclays bank case 
resulting in a GBP 72 million fine. In 2011 and 2012, Barclays executed a series of transactions 
amounting to GBP 1.88 billion on behalf of ultrahigh-net-worth (HNW) clients that were 
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) (Financial Conduct Authority [FCA], 2015). In order to 
take on the clients as quickly as possible and to generate GBP 52.3 million in revenue, Barclays 
decided not to apply its own standard procedures, consisting in performing enhanced Customer 
Due Diligence (CDD) as required by the RBA. The identity of the clients was so sensitive that 
the bank agreed to pay them GBP 37.7 million should their names ever be revealed. In 
November 2015, the FCA (the UK regulator), fined Barclays GBP 72 million. At the time, the 
FCA made the following statement: “While we make no finding that the transaction involved 
financial crime, the circumstances of the transaction gave rise to a number of features which 
indicated a higher level of risk. This required Barclays to adhere to a higher level of due skill, 
care and diligence but Barclays did not follow its standard procedures” (FCA, 2015). In 
addition, the FCA made the following statement: 
“Barclays failed to follow its own standard procedures, failed to implement any 
adequate alternative procedures, and failed to have sufficient regard to the JMLSG 
Guidance and other relevant guidance in issue during the relevant period. Barclays 
focused on its objective of entering into the business relationship and executing the 
transaction quickly and on the exceptional confidentiality restrictions in place, rather 
than on the importance of completing the EDD required and making a careful and 
considered assessment of the potential financial crime risks” (FCA, 2015, p. 22). 
Ultimately, Barclays is a financial institution  driven by revenue, profits and shareholder 
approval. The following extract from the FCA report documenting the circumstances leading 
to the fine, points to that direction as: 
“On the basis of the EDD information available to it at that time (which, as outlined in 
paragraphs 4.32 to 4.47 below, was inadequate) Legal and Compliance did confirm that 
the appropriate level of EDD had been conducted, including that the PEPs had been 
properly identified, and that the Clients’ sources of wealth were legitimate. This was 
not compliant with Barclays’ usual procedures that required the front office to give this 
confirmation. In addition, Legal and Compliance did not have the benefit of the 
knowledge held by front office senior management about the Business Relationship and 
a number of relevant issues that had emerged during negotiations between the Clients 
and senior management” (FCA, 2015, p. 16). 
The compliance subsystem could be interpreted as having had to ‘surrender’ to the greater will 
of the sales subsystem while the goal seeking behaviour of the entire system was oriented 
towards securing the deal.
































































In the figure below, Figure 3, we illustrate Barclays’ 2015 AML fine by applying the basic 
risk/danger skeleton of Figure 2. Barclays bank is represented as system A, system B can be 
society or the regulator for instance. System A’s decision not to apply enhanced due diligence 
in order to quickly onboard the HNW PEP clients, perform the GBP 1.88 billion transaction 
and secure GBP 52 million in revenue may result in a potential fine which is the risk that the 
front office has decided to internalise. The regulator is the victim who, not having been part of 
the decision making process, sees the onboarding of ultrahigh-net-worth clients that are PEPs 
and the execution of GBP 1.88 billion transaction  as ML danger to its jurisdiction. 
Figure 3: Analysis of Barclays Bank 2015 fine through Luhmann’s risk/danger model
At this point, the key building blocks of Luhmann’s systems theory should be clear: When 
stimuli from the environment (e.g. ultra HNW PEPs that want to be onboarded) is considered 
by system A (i.e. Barclays bank in our case), the decision to execute a transaction is brokered 
through internalising the danger that HNW PEPs’ transactions may violate AML regulation 
and weaken the financial system. To the decision-maker (Barclays bank), the consequence of 
risk-taking is the reward (GBP 52 million in revenue), and the risk is receiving a financial fine 
(a GBP 72 million fine on this occasion). To the victim (the regulator), the danger is a breach 
































































of regulation, a threat to the confidence in the financial system and/or a failure to adequately 
manage and prevent financial crime in the UK. 
The relevance of Luhmann’s work on risk and the risk/danger distinction has been illustrated 
through Barclays Bank’s 2015 regulatory fine. To demonstrate the versatility of Luhmann’s 
theoretical framework for exploring and understanding the AML domain, we will now apply 
Luhmann’s risk/danger model to the de-risking phenomenon.
DE-RISKING, RE-RISKING AND BARCLAYS’ ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
The FCA defines de-risking as banks removing “bank accounts/services from customers or 
other relationships which they associate with higher money laundering risk. It has been 
attributed to the increasing overall cost of complying with regulatory requirements” 
(Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 5). The belief is that de-risking is performed in a wholesale manner 
with banks unwilling to truly assess the risk associated with such customers. 
When considered through Luhmann’s risk/danger model, de-risking describes a phenomenon 
whereby financial institutions no longer wish to maintain risks in exchange for potential 
rewards. They therefore seek to externalise those risks they maintain internally, remove them 
from their own systems and feed them back into the their respective environments; in the 
process, they will therefore convert risk back into danger. De-risking arises for a multitude of 
reasons: declining client profitability, increased compliance costs, increased regulatory and 
reputational risks (Ramachandran, et al., 2018), but is essentially driven by the decision-
making system aiming to minimise the complexity it faces. When too many decision-making 
systems externalise their risks, while at the same time, other systems in their respective 
environments are not willing to internalise the corresponding dangers then an accumulation of 
danger emerges in a particular category (e.g. money service businesses). In this regard, we can 
articulate the systemic definition of de-risking as a state of ‘suspended dangers’ that are not 
internalised by systems. 
One side-effect of de-risking is that it may reduce visibility of such ‘suspended dangers’ and 
either push ML into smaller institutions that lack the resources and expertise needed to manage 
high-risk clients. Furthermore, it could also push ML and terrorist financing into financial 
mechanisms, such as alternative remittance systems, that exist outside of regulatory scrutiny. 
































































In addition, de-risking can exclude legitimate businesses and consumers from the financial 
system, which can have negative effects on a country’s economic and social development. 
Finally, such dangers can threaten the credibility of regulators should the latter fail to address 
them (Grima et.al., 2020; Ramachandran et al., 2018; Rose, 2019). To regulators, de-risking 
clearly represents a danger, as it “may drive financial transactions underground which creates 
financial exclusion and reduces transparency, thereby increasing money laundering and 
terrorist financing risks” (FATF, 2015). This concern is also expressed by the FCA which 
states: “we require banks to put in place and maintain policies and procedures to identify, assess 
and manage money-laundering risk. This requires banks to use an effective risk-based 
approach” (FCA, 2015). Thus, when a financial institution transforms a danger “that was 
formerly seen as external into processable and manageable activities” (Renn, 2004, p. 103), its 
decision generates (second-order) danger for entities that neither took part in the decision 
making process nor benefited from the  decision. In this case then, such entities can be the 
regulators and the de-risked customers that are the victims of the de-risking process. The 
regulator has to handle such danger one way or another. The issue, however is that the 
regulator, as a system, communicates and  responds through regulation. For instance, if there 
is a critical mass of financial institutions and banks that no longer wish to internalise dangers 
in exchange of potential rewards, there will be a high volume of danger that will require 
internalisation. The regulator will want to incentivise systems to internalise such danger and 
will need to do so through regulation. 
In sum, by de-risking their own systems, financial institutions create irritations for regulators. 
However, while financial institutions can produce irritations for regulators, they cannot steer 
regulators’ responses to these irritations; responses are determi ed by the regulator itself. In 
the UK, for example, regulators threatened to fine financial institutions that could not provide 
robust rationale for de-risking activities. Systemically, such an approach essentially 
discourages financial institutions from externalising danger and aims to incentivise institutions 
to maintain risk within their systems. This approach, however, imposes a level of complexity 
that financial institutions will not or cannot handle. Placing obstacles to de-risking will have 
its own unintended consequences. The irony in this context is that essentially de-risking is the 
result of the application of the risk-based approach. However, if regulators attempt to prevent 
the application of the FATF’s recommendations, institutions may start “seeking much more 
specific guidance on managing high-risk relationships of the types that have led to account 
exit” (Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 70) possibly demanding the introduction of prescriptive 
































































regulation in order to obtain legal safe harbour for instance. It is the management of this 
dynamic that is now at stake. Figure 4 below presents how the risk/danger distinction is 
operationalised in the context of de-risking. 
Figure 4: De-risking through Luhmann’s risk/danger model 
In Figure 4, the top box represents danger (1). As discussed, it is believed that de-risking is a 
response to an increased cost of compliance, increased regulatory scrutiny, regulatory fines and 
liability. Because of dangers associated with certain customers judged as representing higher 
ML risks, the financial institution (System C) makes the decision to de-risk (2) and thus 
terminates its relationship with higher ML risk customers. This allows the financial institution 
to externalise the risk associated with managing such clients into danger at its environment (3), 
which in turn generates danger for entities that were not involved in the decision-making 
































































process (e.g. de-risked customers or the regulator). In Figure 4, we show one impacted party 
as the regulator (System D) that needs to internalise such phenomena that affect the wider 
financial system’s stability (3). De-risking is perceived by regulators as a danger that may 
affect consumers or create wider competition problems. Thus, if regulators object to an 
institution’s attempt at reducing its own complexity, they may create the danger of fines against 
that very financial institution, which, if levied (4), would represent a new danger (1) that the 
financial institution would be forced to internalise because it made the initial decision to de-
risk (2). At a minimum, regulators could create new guidelines to suppress phenomena like de-
risking. However, these in turn would lead to their own unintended consequences and subjected 
to the variable danger/risk distinctions imposed by various institutions. Ultimately, the 
recursive cycles between danger/risk are inescapable. The very existence of a risk-based 
approach presupposes a de-risking-based approach (DRBA) at the same time. Without the 
development and formalisation of both an RBA and a DRBA, regulators cannot steer their 
institutions (in the cybernetic sense) and they cannot maintain a balance between the two 
distinct phenomena that represent them. 
Even a prescriptive rules-based approach implies that some rules are imposed instead of others. 
In turn, the non-inclusion of other possibilities for rules, generates dangers that can affect AML 
systems in different ways. Put differently, the prescription of a rules-based approach amounts 
to a forced prescription of the non-inclusion of other rules, with each ‘rule’ enabling a mix of 
danger and risk. Ironically, a rules-based approach in itself is also a form of forced de-risking. 
What we also need to highlight is that the financial institution (system C) and the regulator 
(system D) are located in one another’s environment. Decisions in system C generate dangers 
that may be internalised as risks in system D. System D then responds to the risk by creating 
new dangers for system C, which may, in turn, decide to internalise these dangers as risks and 
may then respond by making new decisions perceived as dangers by system D, so on and so 
forth. Thus, the risk/danger distinction is self-referential and reproduces itself at every step of 
the decision-making chain. As Demetis (2010) explains, “risk cannot therefore be specified or 
pointed out simply because it is categorised, even when the perception of risk is communicated; 
its re-genesis will transcend any system that attempts to manipulate it” (p. 113). 
Now that de-risking has been described through Luhmann’s risk/danger model, we explore this 
phenomenon further by looking at how the victim or affected party does not necessarily have 
































































to accept its role of victim and how under such circumstances, re-risking arises. This is 
explored through the Barclays bank vs. Dahabshiil case, which we will now discuss.   
BARCLAYS VS DAHABSHIIL ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
In May 2013, Barclays bank announced it would close approximately 250 accounts belonging 
to Money Service Businesses (ACAMS, 2013). The rationale was that “some of them, 
including some remittance companies, did not have the necessary systems in place to spot 
criminal activity with the degree of confidence required by Barclays’ regulatory environment” 
(Tran, 2013a). The response to such a decision was met with controversy with charities 
explaining that remittance companies “provide a lifeline for 40% of the Somali population” 
(Tran, 2013b) representing USD 1.2bn annually, more than the country’s annual international 
aid (UN Food and Agriculture Organization). As Dahabshiil stated: 
“It is important to remember that we are not just a business. We provide a lifeline 
service to Somalia and other African countries. We enable Somalis to help themselves, 
by sending money to every corner of the Somali territories to enable relatives and 
friends to buy food, medicine and to pay for education. Remittances are also used for 
investment in business start-ups and property – remittances are helping Somalis get the 
country back onto its feet after two decades of war” (Dahabshiil, press release, 23 
February 2017).
Barclays Bank, however, explained in a statement that it had “made a legitimate decision to 
exit these businesses based upon the well-known risks of money laundering and terrorist 
financing in the money service business sector” (Moore, 2013). Essentially, Barclays bank’s 
decision was driven by exposure to financial crime risk. Yet, Dahabshiil’s solicitors issued a 
high court application seeking to prevent Barclays from closing its accounts. They claimed 
that:
“by giving them notice of its intention to withdraw banking services from their 
businesses Barclays has acted (or is threatening to act) unlawfully, because (put shortly) 
Barclays is alleged to be in a dominant position in the market for the provision of 
banking services to money service businesses, either generally or in relation to the 
particular sector in which the relevant claimant operates, and by ceasing to provide such 
services without objective justification Barclays would be abusing its dominant 
position contrary to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998” (Dahabshiil & 
others v Barclays Bank Plc, 2013). 
































































In October 2013, the court granted an injunction preserving business relationships between 
Dahabshiil and Barclays until the full trial took place and awarded Dahabshiil the costs of 
seeking the injunction. 
To understand this case through Luhmann’s risk/danger model, we now consider Figure 5. 
System E represents Barclays, which has previously on-boarded MSBs (identified as being 
high-risk by the FATF) and internalised the risk presented by this customer base. More 
specifically, on-boarding MSBs as clients is a risk that was accepted by the banking institution 
and, as decision maker, the institution implemented adequate mitigating tools for managing 
this risk. Now system E has decided to de-risk, which entails the financial institution to unbank 
MSBs because of a new climate of close regulatory scrutiny, for instance, thus lowering 
financial crime risk tolerance for this sector. 
Barclays (system E) terminates this relationship to comply with its obligation to apply the risk-
based approach. Dahabshiil (system F), affected by Barclays’ decision, takes Barclays to court 
and obtains an injunction against Barclays, preventing it from terminating their relationship. 
Through this process, Dahabshiil internalised the danger posed by Barclays’ de-risking 
decision by means of taking Barclays to court. This internalisation turned that danger into risk, 
more specifically, the risk of having the court judging in favour of Barclays bank. However, 
the court’s decision allowed Dahabshiil (system F) to refuse system E’s de-risking. By taking 
Barclays to court, system F rejected Barclays’ de-risking decision and prevented it from being 
able to externalize its financial crime risk. This is described in Figure 5 with the process 
“Refuse de-risking”  “Second-order de-risking within F”. Furthermore, the decision to reject 
Barclays’ de-risking attempt impacted Barclays itself. Barclays was taken to court and was 
impacted by such events, financially of course and reputationally. This is shown in Figure 5 by 
the arrow between the “second-order de-risking within F” box and the “Second-order danger” 
box, which then leads to the “Danger” box affecting System E. This case illustrates the 
repurposing of system F danger into system E danger. 
The key takeaway, however, is the fact that Dahabshiil was unwilling to internalise the danger 
of being de-risked and by taking Barclays to court, it rejected the level of complexity that would 
have come with being unbanked.
































































Figure 5: De-risking and re-risking
Now that we have discussed the Dahabshiil vs Barclays case, we delineate three distinct 
possibilities in how the decision making process of System F could react to system E’s de-
risking decision:
Scenario 1: Accepting De-risking
System F represents an MSB that now faces a decision in relation to handling the danger 
generated by system’s E decision. The MSB could decide to accept the signalling from system 
E and implement processes to establish and maintain the existing relationship with system E, 
or it could secure a relationship with another financial institution. System F may thus decide to 
improve its own risk management system to address the banking sector’s risk aversion to 
regulatory scrutiny. More specifically, system F may decide to implement better procedures 
for account monitoring, develop KYC policies, audit Customer Due Diligence processes, 
and/or strengthen risk management systems. In this scenario, system F assumes the role of 
decision maker and internalises the danger generated by system E (through risk 
externalisation). Under such circumstances, re-risking occurs. This is represented in figure 5 
with the process “Subsequent decision of risk externalisation: De-risking”  “Danger”  
































































“Accept de-risking”  “Re-risking within F”. 
Implication for de-risking: Under scenario 1, system E successfully de-risks and system F, 
through its own decision-making, is not a victim who faces danger. Instead, system F re-risks 
its own system.
Scenario 2: Rejecting de-risking
Another scenario illustrated by Figure 5 is the possibility that system F rejects system E’s de-
risking, refusing to internalise the risk that system E has externalised through de-risking. In 
such a case, system F does not re-risk its own system, and similar to what we observed in the 
Dahabshiil vs Barclays case, through its own decision-making, system F transfers the danger 
generated by system E into the environment.
Implication for de-risking: Under scenario 2, danger re-enters the environment because system 
F makes the decision not to internalise it as risk (as observed in Figure 4, step 4). System E 
may be able to de-risk successfully if system F transfers the danger into the environment, 
without it impacting system E. However, if system E becomes the victim of system F’s 
decision, system E will be unable to de-risk successfully thus impacting its ability to manage 
risk and sustain its systems and controls as per its risk appetite.
Scenario 3: Enduring de-risking
The final scenario illustrated in Figure 5 is that in which system F does not make any decisions 
and remains victim of the consequences of system E’s de-risking initiatives.  
Implication for de-risking: System F is the victim that now needs to find other systems (i.e. 
other financial institutions) that will accept to onboard it as customer. When viewed 
collectively, the frameworks and scenarios we present above can serve as a blueprint for 
introducing a de-risking based approach (DRBA).
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS
De-risking is essentially the contagion effect of risk assessments. This point is re-enforced by 
the FCA’s sponsored report on de-risking that highlights FATF and FCA statements on 
“wholesale cutting loose of entire classes of customers” (FATF, 2015) and on “banks dealing 
































































generically with whole categories of customers or potential customers” (FCA, 2015). The 
FATF has essentially designated whole categories of customers and sectors as high-risk. It 
ultimately flags the probability of ML risks unto entire classes of customers. Why is then de-
risking stigmatised when it is the mirror-image of the FATF’s process? In fact, de-risking is a 
naturally occurring phenomenon which follows the risk assessment and hence the decision 
making process dictated by the FATF. Regulators are essentially denouncing the fact that too 
many institutions are abiding by the FATF’s guidance. 
This is frustrating to banks because “a bank’s decision on risk assessment may be the same 
whether it is undertaken on a case by case basis or wholesale basis, because the factors applied 
will not vary too much” (Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 19). “Risk assessments will score similar 
customers in similar ways. Thus a set of similar customers will fall outside the Financial 
Institutions’ risk appetite and thus be exited” (Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 24).
Furthermore, the cost of complianc  is high, there is a lack of confidence in the regulator and 
fear of misinterpretations of regulator  expectations. Financial institutions simply do not feel 
that they have the support from the regulator. The FCA sponsored report on de-risking states: 
“Many of the banks we have spoken to have indicated that, although they take a RBA 
to each client relationship, they are not just building in the actual risk of a client (or its 
customers) acting in a damaging way—they are also building in their assessment of 
how the appropriate regulators, or financial institutions higher up the ‘food chain’ (who 
are almost seen to be acting in a quasi-regulatory capacity), will assess their approach. 
Essentially there is a certain amount of second-guessing going on. In today’s 
environment, the vast majority of these assessments will fall on the side of caution” 
(Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 40). 
Hence de-risking also reflects financial institutions’ lack of confidence in the regulator and 
uncertainties in relation to regulatory expectations. In addition, de-risking concerns private 
sector responses to irritations from its environment (such as the regulator), communicating a 
willingness to forfeit a region or a sector to signal good faith based on ML scandals. This is 
what Deutsche Bank did when it “broke off its relationship as a correspondent bank for US 
dollars with Danske in Estonia in September 2015 because of concerns over non-resident 
customers” (Milne, 2018). Similarly, Danske Bank announced in 2018 that “it would scale 
down its business in the Baltic countries to focus on the Nordic markets” (Reuters, 2018). 
Such an exit is, of course, not the result of a simple fear of misinterpreting regulatory 
expectations; rather it is a move that demonstrates Danske Bank’s understanding of regulatory 
































































expectations. On such occasions, de-risking is a decision made by a financial institution to 
communicate its new risk appetite and regulate the system’s exposure to regulatory scrutiny of 
course, as well as to ML risks.
“Many of the banks we have spoken to have indicated that, although they take a RBA 
to each client relationship, they are not just building in the actual risk of a client (or its 
customers) acting in a damaging way—they are also building in their assessment of 
how the appropriate regulators, or financial institutions higher up the ‘food chain’ (who 
are almost seen to be acting in a quasi-regulatory capacity), will assess their approach. 
Essentially there is a certain amount of second-guessing going on. In today’s 
environment, the vast majority of these assessments will fall on the side of caution” 
(Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 40). 
Although de-risking is perceived by the regulator as danger from its environment, it is the result 
of irritations triggered by the regulator itself, which in turn affect its own environment. As 
such, the regulator needs to be mindful that ML risk and regulatory risk feed off one another 
and affect financial institutions’ perception and understanding of risk. Another element that 
needs to be raised is the fact that de-risking is to be expected since organisations seek to 
minimise their exposure to risks that sit outside their appetite. Yet, if too many organisations 
de-risk at the same time, externalising their risk into danger, there may be a critical mass of 
victims (as per Luhmann’s risk/danger model) facing such danger. This is a phenomenon 
observed in the USA where a World Bank survey (2014) identified that 80% of MSBs were 
struggling with account opening. Under such circumstances, we prescribe encouraging and 
incentivising re-risking. 
De-risking initiatives observed amongst financial institutions are strategies for the latter to 
minimise their systems’ exposure to risk and externalise ML and regulatory risk. The regulator 
may respond to a new ML danger by introducing a new regulation for MSBs for example. The 
risk for such a new regulation may be the deployment of additional supervisory resources to 
ensure compliance. As we have seen, the danger to financial institutions may be uncertainty 
with regards to the regulator’s expectations resulting into the institution’s de-risking of MSBs. 
In addition, since de-risking aims to minimise exposure, it should not be prevented as it 
involves imposing a complexity that the system is not willing to handle. However, on the other 
hand, de-risked customers such as MSBs are in turn encouraged to reject their role of victim 
(as per Luhmann’s risk/danger model) and the danger they face once de-risked. Inevitably, the 
financial institution’s de-risking may result into second order danger such as MSBs seeking 
services from institutions that do not have the bandwidth or level of sophistication to deal with 
































































high ML risk clients such as MSBs, thus exposing the jurisdiction to additional ML danger. 
Similarly, we note that regulators object to de-risking when too many decision-making systems 
reduce their complexity and convert their risk back to danger while other systems do not or 
cannot internalise such danger. 
To prevent too many decision makers from de-risking at the same time and ensure that victims 
have the ability to become decision-makers, the regulator needs to consider its actions through 
Luhmann’s risk/danger theory. Essentially, the regulator has the following approaches to 
address de-risking:
- Provide means for victims to internalise or reject danger;
- Provide means for decision-makers to maintain danger internalisation; 
- Increase decision makers’ ability to internalise danger;
- Decrease the danger within the environment;
In light of the above points, we are proposing that the regulator should act as a router steering 
the transition from de-risking to re-risking and vice versa. Formalising the options we 
deconstruct above into a De-Risking Based Approach (DRBA) and introducing a coherent set 
of recommendations for managing de-risking when it occurs can allow a better distribution 
between risks and their (institutional) handlers. 
Tension between regulating de-risking versus banning de-risking has been observed but 
ultimately, the regulator needs to facilitate systems’ ability to either internalise or reject danger 
while also incentivising decision-makers to either internalise danger or maintain danger 
internalisation. As such, the regulator should create mechanisms to facilitate danger rejection 
as observed with Dahabshiil. Similarly, to encourage danger internalisation, the regulator 
should provide support and/or training with the development of robust Know Your Customer 
(KYC) and CDD for victims and decision-makers. In addition, more time can be provided to 
other systems/institutions within the environment to decide whether they wish to internalise 
danger and absorb systemic de-risking when it occurs. Regulators should increase the 
minimum notice period between decision to de-risk and actual customer exit and provide a 
mechanism, platform, or information system for swift onboarding to other institutions. An 
information system for brokering KYC-interoperability and supporting the transferability of 
onboarding documentation between institutions could support such efforts to regulate de-
risking. Furthermore, to limit the regulatory uncertainty, the regulator should aim to provide 
































































for customisations of its de-risking based approach for categories most affected by de-risking 
(Correspondent Banking Relationships, Non Profit Organisations, Fintechs, MSBs). Finally, to 
facilitate decision makers’ ability to internalise danger, the regulator should provide further 
guidance and support for categories that represent a greater source of risk to financial 
institutions. It should develop and sign-off a risk appetite evaluation tool and methodology to 
validate financial institutions’ risk appetite and ensure decision makers’ risk appetite is aligned 
to that of the regulator.
The following table lists key actions the regulator could implement to address de-risking 
systemically:
Theory Recommendations Outcome(s)
1) Create frameworks 
or mechanisms to 
facilitate danger 
rejection as performed 
by Dahabshiil (e.g. the 
use of courts and 
leveraging laws and 
regulation).
Financial institutions are incentivised to keep 
danger internalised and continue to manage 
the business relationship. 
FIs identify which complexity they can face: 
dealing with potential victims’ danger 
rejection or the potential ML risk they 
represent. 
FIs may end up facing more complexity than 
their systems and controls can handle to 
avoid litigation.  
2) Provide support 
and/or training with the 
development of robust 
KYC/CDD for victims 
and decision-makers.
De-risked customers have stronger internal 
processes which may increase their costs but 
ensures ongoing access to banking services. 
In turn, the banki g industry develops greater 




to internalise or 
reject danger. 
3) Increase the notice 
period between decision 
to de-risk and actual 
customer exit and 
provide a mechanism, 
platform, or 
information system for 
swift onboarding to 
other institutions. 
Provides time for victims to identify the next 
course of actions and enables other systems 
within the environment to decide whether 




4) Customise de-risking 
proposals  
The regulator regains a certain level of 
responsibility temporarily and hence liability 












































































guidance and support 
for categories that 
represent a greater 
source of risk to 
financial institutions. 
to ensure that the private sector has a clear 
understanding and visibility of the regulator’s 
expectations. 
This may increase the regulator’s 
reputational and credibility risk but in 
exchange such an initiative will reduce the 






5) Develop and sign-off 
a risk appetite 
evaluation tool and 
methodology to validate 
financial institutions’ 
risk appetite and ensure 
decision makers’ risk 
appetite is aligned to 
that of the regulator.
Oversee and sign-off 
FIs’ RBA. 
By formalising their risk appetites, financial 
institutions may decide to unbank categories 
of customers in what the regulator may 
qualify as a wholesale manner. While this 
may create an initial de-risking wave, it will 
increase the transparency of the jurisdiction’s  
overall risk appetite, facilitate information 
flow and as such increase decision-makers’ 
confidence in the regulator, remove 
uncertainty, thus increasing decision makers’ 
ability to internalise danger and facilitating 





to transfer risk 




6) Introduce guidance 
on a De-Risking Based 
Approach (DRBA) that 
formalises the 
management and 
handling of de-risking 
Develop a set of flexible measures to assess 
countries and FIs’ appetite and/or tolerance 
to ML risk more effectively and apply 
measures proportionate to the level of 
appetite and/or tolerance in order for FIs to 
focus their DRBA more effectively. 
Develop specific guidance and support for 
de-risking scenarios with case studies for 
both decision-makers and victims (as per 
Luhmann’s risk/danger model) as per 
recommendations 1 to 5.
Table 1: Recommendations to address de-risking
































































Figure 6: The De-Risking Based Approach 
Figure 6 summarises the recommendations documented in Table 1 and articulates the De-
Risking Based Approach. 
CONCLUSION
The relevance of Luhmann’s work on risk and the risk/danger model has been illustrated 
through Barclays Bank’s 2015 regulatory fine, the de-risking phenomenon, and Dahabshiil vs. 
Barclays Bank, thus demonstrating the versatility of Luhmann’s theoretical framework for 
exploring and understanding the AML domain. In light of Luhmann’s risk/danger model, we 
argue that de-risking should not be prevented nor discouraged. It needs to be managed carefully 
through the introduction of a de-risking based approach (DRBA). Organisations need to have 
the ability to de-risk in order to minimise their level of complexity and align it to the robustness 
of their internal systems and controls. Victims have the possibility to reject danger or to 
internalise it as a risk which, too, can subsequently be de-risked. Through the de-risking 
process, a system signals that a particular risk is being externalised and converted back into a 
danger that other systems can internalise as a risk or face as a danger. Accordingly, regulators 
should leverage the dynamic between risk and danger and implement measures to support 
victims of de-risking by enabling the latter to either reject or delay the danger of de-risking. In 
































































addition, regulators must manage the level of complexity faced by the risk-takers (i.e. the 
decision makers) once they feel that their systems can no longer handle a certain risk threshold; 
in this context, regulators should minimise the regulatory ambiguity and uncertainty which 
financial institutions perceive as regulatory risk. This can be achieved through accepting 
greater liability and developing greater transparency with regards to financial institutions’ and 
regulators’ ML risk appetite.
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